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Introduction
The decision of the British House of Lords in Page v Smith has raised
a number of interesting issues in the area of foreseeability of (what might be
termed 'secondary') harm to a primary victim and the 'boundaries' of liability
of a tortfeasor who causes it. 1 The facts of the particular case seem to be
straightforward except in one regard, the absence of physical injury. The
plaintiff, Ronald Page, was driving with his family when he became involved
in a car accident with the defendant, Simon Smith. Both Page and his family
escaped unhurt. However, the plaintiff suffered from what was described as
a 'chronic fatigue syndrome' (CFS) which became permanent after the
accident. The plaintiff therefore claimed against the defendant for the
recrudescence ofhis condition and his resulting inability to work again. The
lower court found in his favour and awarded him damages. The Court of
Appeal reversed the earlier ruling and decided that the defendant was not
liable for the consequent injury to the plaintiff.2 It was left to the House of
Lords to consider the tenuous link between the negligent act of Smith and the
belated consequence of 'harm' to Page. In the event, the House affirmed the
lower court's decision.
The fact that the defendant's act did not directly result in a physical harm
but only a change of a psychological state (at a later stage) amounting, at
most, to an indirect injury prompts the question whether the House of Lord's
ruling on the basis of the ordinary duty-of-care-breach-of-duty-causation
approach was appropriate. It seems that the highest court did not view the
[1995] 2 WLR 644.
2 [1994]4 All ER 522.
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case as presenting any new issue that had not been dealt with previously. Its
treatment left no doubt that it chose to characterise Page v Smith as being
similar to earlier cases except in detail only. While prior case law considered
the scope of, and limits to, culpability of a defendant for actions or omissions
that might foreseeably have consequences beyond the first or direct victim,3
Page v Smith posed the question of the extent of liability in a completely
different way: that of foreseeability of 'non-physical' harm to a primary victim
who did not suffer any physical injury.
The Permissibility of Recovery in Principle
The water-tight classification of injury into either physical or mental, on
the one hand, and the reluctance to accept a claim for recovery for mental
shock in so far as it was not an after-effect or simultaneous result of physical
injury, on the other, had proved so enduring in English law that, until very
recently, plaintiffs seemed to have no recourse at all. Case authorities
provided no consistent rules as to whether negligently caused nervous shock,
but neither preceded nor accompanied by damage to property or physical
injury, should be compensatable in principle. 4
The first step towards removing the distinction so long maintained
between physical and nervous injury as regards legal remedy to a victim and
the question of foreseeability of both was taken in Kink v Phillips. 5 In that
case, Denning LJ not only brushed away the distinction that used to be
entrenched in English law but formulated a rule of foreseeability:
The true principle, as I see it, is this: Every driver can and should foresee that, if
he drives negligently, he may injure somebody in the vicinity in some way or
other; and he must be responsible for all the injuries which he does in fact cause
by his negligence to anyone in the vicinity, whether they are wounds, or shocks,
unless they are too remote in law to be recovered. If he does by his negligence in
The major relevant cases are Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92, McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] AC
410, and Alcock v ChiefConstable ofSouth Yorkshire Police [1992] AC 310.
4 For the evolution ofcase law in this area, see Nicholas J Mullany and Peter R Handford, Tort liability
for psychiatriC damage; the law of 'nervous shock', (1993) The Law Book Company, Sweet &
Maxwell.
[1953] I QB 429.
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fact cause injury by shock, then he should be liable for it unless he is exempted on
the ground of remoteness. 6
The juxtaposition of 'wounds' to 'shocks' clearly broke down any
separation between the two that prevailed in legal analysis before then.
Although such a characterisation makes an answer to the (second) question of
foreseeability redundant, Lord Denning put it clearly that the issue of recovery
for nervous shock was determinable by applying the ordinary rules.
In Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd, 7 Lord Reid took the elastic view that a
defendant 'will be liable for any type of damage which is reasonably
foreseeable as liable to happen even in the most unusual case, unless the risk
is so small that a reasonable man would in the whole circumstances feel
justified in neglecting if.s Although this pronouncement was obiter and came
by way of comparing the latitude of foreseeability of liability under contract
law with that under tort law, it underscored and endorsed Lord Denning's
earlier formulation of the problem. The only difference appeared to be a
preference for terms ofart, referring to 'the risk' as being 'small' as opposed to
'remote'. Lord Upjohn also took the same position using only a slight
variation of the term of art: 'The test in tort, as now developed in the
authorities, is that the tortfeasor is liable for any damage which he can
reasonably foresee may happen as a result of the breach however unlikely it
may be, unless it can be brushed aside as far fetched'. 9
It may be objected that Lord Upjohn's reference to 'any damage' does
not necessarily include both the physical and psychological types as the
distinction has always been maintained in tort law, despite medical evidence
to the contrary. Yet, the case for a unitary approach seems to have been fully
stated, albeit not explicitly.
Once the rigid separation of the types of injury was removed as regards
the characterisation of legal issues relating to them, it did not take long for
similar treatments to be brought in for legal remedies too. However,
Ibid. P 440.
[1969] 1 AC 350.
Ibid, pp 385-6.
9 Ibid, P 422.
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differences in the incidence of mental illness soon required special attention
in the courts. The next step the courts had to take thus involved the
determination of liability where mental illness was delayed, despite the
existence of physical injury, or was antecedent as well as incidental to it.
This task faced the courts in the Australian case (originating in New
South Wales), HojJmueller v Commonwealth. 10 The case concerned a motor
car accident which resulted immediately in very slight physical injury to the
appellant (and his children travelling with him) with a nervous illness
following at a later stage. The respondent, the Commonwealth of Australia,
accepted liability for causing the accident. The issue before the District Court
was whether the injured could recover for the delayed mental illness. The
court formulated the main question as being one of causation: whether the
disorder was a consequence of the accident or something which would
develop in any case. The reasoning was that, if the accident was a mere
condition (a triggering incident) for the emergence of the symptoms, then
recovery would be denied (as it eventually was). The judge gave a lot of
weight to the medical evidence which indicated that the injured was suffering
from anxiety (and that he had an obsessional personality) which was
developing into a condition such that the symptoms that emerged after the
accident would surface anyway. The District Court judge hence awarded
compensation only for the physical injury.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the relationship
between the accident and the subsequent symptoms was examined and it was
ruled that there was no cause and effect relationship and that the defendant
was not responsible for the symptoms. Mahoney JA reasoned that the
plaintiff's 'anxiety feelings proceed from the personality; they precede and are
not generated by such an accident as the present'. 11 He added that the
defendant would only have been responsible had he acted knowing of the
possibility that symptoms would be precipitated, or carelessly disregarding
that they might be. He considered the existence of duty to be irrelevant so
long as the act 'is not the physical cause of them or the reason for them but
merely the occasion of them'. 12 It is difficult to think how the act would not
10
11
12
[1981] 54 FLR 48.
Ibid. pp 61-2.
Ibid, P 63
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in any sense be a factor in the incidence of the mental illness, however pre-
existing it may have been in some form. Indeed, there seems to have been a
shift away from determining whether the defendant was liable for negligently
causing the incidence of the illness to that ofwhether he caused the illness per
se. It is submitted that the preference to deal with causation of the illness
rather than its incidence forced the court to beg the very issue with which it
started to deal. As a consequence, it confirmed what was factually
determinable and, by adopting the wrong conclusion, it left the legal issue still
open.
Having abandoned this issue, Mahoney JA went on to address the
applicability of the 'thin skull' rule to the case. He argued that which the law
requires a defendant should foresee, the possibility of a plaintiffs skull being
thin, extending such a duty to include persons 'having paranoid persecution
conditions or an obsessional personality such that [the defendant's] acts may
become the occasion for the onset of the symptoms of their conditions' would
end up 'casting the limit of damages too widely'.13 This appears to affirm
Lord Wright's reasoning in Bourhill v Young that culpability of a negligent
defendant should be dependent on the 'normal standard of susceptibility' of
the plaintiff in the specific situation. 14
The same issues were considered in an English case, Brice v Brown, a
little later but with quite an opposite decision. 15 The case concerned a plaintiff
who had a hysterical personality disorder from childhood but the disorder
manifested itself only occasionally. The plaintiff sustained a minor injury
while a taxi she was travelling in with her daughter collided with an oncoming
bus. Her behaviour became erratic and she was eventually hospitalised. She
subsequently claimed against the taxi and bus company for the severity of the
mental illness and resulting disablement. The defendants contended that the
precise nature and extent of the mental shock should have been foreseeable
but was not. The High Court held that 'the kind and type of injury which she
has in fact sustained is the same as that which could reasonably have been
foreseen. The fact that the tortfeasor could not foresee the precise name the
13
14
15
Ibid, P64.
[1942]2 All ER 396. Lord Wright argued thus Cat 460): 'The test of the plaintiffs extraordinary
susceptibility, ifunknown to the defendant, would in effect make the defendant an insurer'
[1984] I All ER 997.
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psychiatrists were to put on the condition or the precise mental or
psychological process that led to that result is immaterial, because a
completely normal person would not have suffered the consequences that the
plaintiff in fact suffered'. The conclusion was that the plaintiff could claim.
It is submitted that the High Court's decision left the critical questions
unanswered. While the Australian decision erred on the side of neglecting the
question of foreseeability of the incidence of the underlying illness, the
English High Court never even considered its relevance to the determination
ofliability. Under the circumstances, the opposite ways the decision went do
not reveal any rational basis.
Again, the same issue was at the centre of the dispute in the Australian
High Court case, Jaensch v Coffey, on appeal from the Supreme Court of
South Australia. 16 Although that case concerned a secondary victim's claim,
it is relevant here, especially, because of the judgement of Deane J as will be
seen below. The facts briefly were that the wife of a motor cyclist who
suffered serious injury in a collision with a vehicle negligently driven by
Jaensch sought to claim for nervous shock that allegedly occurred after she
saw her husband in hospital and was told by the staff that his condition was
'pretty bad' and deteriorating.
Brennan J argued that it is not 'the precise events leading to the
administration of the shock' but shock and 'some recognised' psychiatric
illness induced by it which should be reasonably foreseeable. 17 According to
him, liability for psychiatric illness cannot be established independently of the
shock that induced it: 'Liability in negligence for nervous shock depends upon
the reasonable foreseeability of both elements and of the causal relationship
between them' .18 Above all, and in what matters to our topic of discussion,
he considered delay in the occurrence or distance as adding to the problem of
proof (of causation and foreseeability) rather than as important in
themselves. 19
Deane J, on the other hand, noted that addressing the issue of proximity
16
17
18
19
[1983-84]155 CLR549.
Ibid. P 563.
Ibid. pp 566-7.
Ibid, P 570.
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has not appeared to be necessary in cases involving direct physical damage to
person or property so long as the sustained damage was reasonably
foreseeable. He added, 'the fact that, as a practical matter, any separate
requirement of proximity is commonly disregarded in cases where no issue is
raised about it does not establish that it has been discarded as a matter of
principle. All that the fact establishes is that, in such cases, the requirement
of proximity is not a subject ofdispute'. 20 It is submitted that, as we shall see
below, the majority of their Lordships in Page v Smith did precisely what
Deane J warned against.
Regarding foreseeability of psychiatric injury, Deane J stated two
limitations, the first of which is relevant to our line of enquiry. He stated that,
unless the risk of psychiatric injury ('unassociated with conventional physical
injury') in the particular form was reasonably foreseeable, proof of
foreseeability of physical harm alone would not be sufficient to grant a claim
for such psychiatric injury?l
In the end, the Australian High Court held that the events which caused
the plaintiff shock were part of the aftermath of the accident resulting from the
defendant's negligence and affirmed the lower courts' decision. The argument
about her abnormal susceptibility to injury was also rejected, just as in the
lower courts, for lack of factual evidence to support it.
The uncertainty in all these cases seems to have been cleared
considerably since Attia v British Gas. 22 The modem rule seems to be that a
'primary victim' who has not suffered any injury to his physical being might
succeed in claiming for nervous shock if such shock results from damage to
his property. The only serious hurdle that a claimant may have to overcome
in such situations is tendering proof of foreseeability of shock. In Attia v
British Gas, where this issue was central to the appeal, Dillon LJ formulated
the problem as follows:
Was the damage, in the way ofpsychiatric illness from shock, though of a different
kind from the damage to the house itselfand contents most obviously foreseeable,
nonetheless foreseeable? Would the reasonable man, endowed with appropriately
20
21
22
Ibid, pp 581-2
Ibid, P 604.
[1988] I QB 304.
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progressive awareness of mental illness, have regarded the danger of psychiatric
illness from shock as so fantastic or far-fetched that he would have paid no
attention to it or would he have thought that it was somethin~ that the plaintiff
might suffer from seeing her house and its contents in flames? 3
In the event, he concluded that, while it was foreseeable that the plaintiff
would see and hear her house burning, the question whether her 'assumed
illness caused by the shock was or was not a foreseeable consequence of the
defendant's negligence must depend on the actual evidence given at the trial'. 24
Consequently, he held that the issue was, in principle, not incapable of
determination, only that it could not be done by the Court of Appeal itself
since the facts were not ascertained at the trial court.
WoolfLJ approached the matter in a different way. He argued that 'the
plaintiff could well have sustained physical injuries as well as the psychiatric
injuries of which she complains when she would have been entitled to
damages and in my view there can be no reason of policy for distinguishing
between the two types of injury'. 25 According to him, it did not matter that the
plaintiff was not physically injured in so far as it was conceivable that she
might have been. He seemed to postulate that both types of injury are
inseparable or, even, identical so that if the one occurred, the other would be
inevitable, or vice versa. The argument would nevertheless not stand because
the real facts, as found, have been substituted by hypothetical ones. Although
Lord Woolf took the view that the identity of the two types of injury should be
maintained (and therefore appeared to back the finding of medical science),
he furnished no proof for his assumption that once one was found the other
should be deemed to have been there and recovery should be allowed as a
matter of course. Yet, his assumption more or less pre-empted the ruling of
the majority in Page v Smith.
Bingham LJ, by contrast, sought to address the issues in terms of first
principles, that is firstly, establishing a duty of care if the plaintiff is 'so
closely and directly affected by the defendant's act that he ought reasonably to
have him or her in contemplation as being so affected when he directs his
23 Ibid, P 313.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid. P 317.
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mind to the acts of omissions which are called in question'. If such a duty
exists, the next step would be to consider whether the plaintiffs psychiatric
damage is 'too remote to be recoverable because not reasonably foreseeable
as a consequence of the defendant's careless conduct'. 26 The suggested
identical treatment of issues of duty of care and that of liability for breach of
that duty does not appear to appreciate the inherent differences in the issues.
It is submitted that, by reducing the problem of determination of foreseeability
of psychiatric injury to 'the ordinary test of remoteness in tort', Lord Bingham
merely avoided solving it.
By contrast, in Nicholls v Rushton,27 it was ruled that the plaintiff could
not recover because the nervous reaction suffered by him after the motor car
collision fell short of an identifiable psychological illness. The Court of
Appeal held that if there was no physical injury, nor a psychological injury,
there could be no question of awarding damages for mental suffering, fear,
anxiety and the like.
Should Foreseeability be taken for granted where Primary Victims
Claim?
An important factor that emerges from the perusal of previous case
authorities in this area of the law is that the issue raised in Page v Smith was
the first of its kind to appear before the House of Lords. In other words,
negligent injury of the type claimed under the specific circumstances of that
case has not been contested before the House. We will see to what extent the
House's decision went towards clarifYing the problem raised in the lower
courts.
The defendant had contended in the lower court that, since the impact
of the accident was minimal, the onset of the syndrome could not possibly
have been caused by it and therefore would not have been foreseeable. It may
be recalled from our earlier discussion that this line of argument was
consistent with the decision in Hoffmueller v Commonwealth. The plaintiffs
submission, on the other hand, was that, as long as the accident was caused
by a defendant's careless driving and that it could foreseeably result in some
26
27
Ibid, P 319.
The Times (19 June 1992).
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form of personal injury (physical or psychological), it would be necessary to
prove that the particular form of injury was foreseeable. The court rejected
the defendant's submission on the basis of the 'egg-shell' rule. Otton J argued,
'Once it is established that CFS exists, and that a relapse or recrudescence can
be triggered by the trauma of an accident, and that nervous shock was suffered
by the plaintiff who was actually involved in the accident, it becomes a
foreseeable consequence'.28
In its reversal of the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeal relied
heavily on the test of phlegm/fortitude (that an ordinary plaintiff is supposed
to have) not to limit, but to reject the liability of the defendant. It reasoned
that the claimed 'injury was not foreseeable in a person of ordinary
fortitude' .29 Farquharson LJ thus concluded that 'while the nature of the
accident was such that at the moment of the defendant's negligent driving
some physical injury to the plaintiff was foreseeabale, the circumstances taken
as a whole do not establish the defendant could reasonably have foreseen that
the plaintiff would suffer any mental injury'. 30 Hoffman LJ added that the
plaintiffs experience of the accident as a participant does not exempt him
from proving the foreseeability of the alleged mental trauma. 31 Accordingly,
he did not view it to be 'reasonably foreseeable that this accident would cause
Mr Page compensatable damage by mental trauma'.32
The strength of the Court of Appeal's (majority) decision was that they
did not seek to resolve the issue of foreseeability of harm merely by reference
to the plaintiffs status as bystander or direct participant. They went on to
argue that, whatever the status of the plaintiff was, his claim could only be
legally tenable if the harm he suffered had been reasonably foreseeable by the
defendant. In other words, by advancing the argument that nervous shock
befalling a participant must be proved to be reasonably foreseeable just as
much as for a non-participant, they reduced the requirements on direct or
indirect victims, to the same legal rationale.
28
29
30
31
32
Quoted in [1994] All ER 522, at 533
Ibid.
Ibid, P 548.
Ibid, P 550.
Ibid, P 553.
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The House ofLords decision, on the other hand, would appear to point
towards continuing divergence in the treatment of the two types of victims
although they deny that a different approach directed at the types of injuries
ofa primary victim was unnecessary. In affirming the trial judge's decision,
the majority held that, as long as the defendant was under a duty of care
towards the plaintiff not to cause him harm, the type of harm he actually
caused the plaintiff was immaterial; the only thing that required to be
established was that the defendant's negiligent act would foreseeably harm the
plaintiff. They concluded that the risk of injury by nervous shock was
foreseeable and allowed the appeal. The grounds of such a decision have,
however, not been the same for all their Lordships.
Lord Brown-Wilkinson in particular stressed (along with Lord Lloyd)33
that determination of issues relating to mental illness cannot be undertaken
differently from those relating to physical illness (taking on board growing
evidence supplied by medical science as to the identical nature of the two).
As far as the case before the court was concerned, his Lordship did not think
that the non-occurrence of 'tangible physical injury' was relevant to the
question whether the plaintiff could recover'damages for the recrudescence
of his illness'. Instead he saw the main question to be 'whether a driver ofa
car should reasonably foresee that a person involved in an accident may suffer
psychiatric injury of some kind, whether or not accompanied by physical
injury'.34 According to him, such a driver 'should reasonably foresee that, if
he drives carelessly, he will be liable to cause injury, either physical or
psychiatric or both, to other users of the highway who become involved in an
accident'. He did not find it difficult to establish that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty to prevent foreseeable injury to him, 'including psychiatric
damage' and that 'the defendant must take the plaintiff as he found him',
regardless of the fact that 'the defendant could not foresee the exact type of
psychiatric damages in fact suffered by the plaintiff. 35
Lord Lloyd, on his part, saw Page v Smith to be different from earlier
cases that appeared before the House in that the plaintiff in those cases was a
'secondary' victim of the defendant's negligence, being in the position of a
33
34
35
[1995] 2 WLR 645, at 667.
Ibid. pp 660-661.
Ibid, pp 661-662.
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spectator or a bystander. In this case, however, the plaintiff was a primary
victim. He framed the issue to be whether 'the foreseeability of physical
injury is enough to enable the plaintiff to recover damages for nervous
shock' .36 Citing the important fact that the plaintiff did not suffer 'external
injury', as he called it,37 he asked whether that would necessitate a different
legal solution, or a 'different test', and force the court 'to concern itself with
different 'kinds' of injury'?38 He considered the incidence of the type of illness,
that it was or was not accompanied by physical injury, to be totally
inconsequential. 39 He contended:
Foreseeability of psychiatric injury remains a crucial ingredient when the plaintiff
is the secondary victim, for the very reason that the secondary victim is almost
always outside the area of physical impact, and therefore outside the range of
foreseeable physical injury. But where the plaintiff is the primary victim of the
defendant's negligence, the nervous shock cases, by which I mean the cases
following on from Bourhill v Young, are not in point. Since the defendant was
admittedly under a duty of care not to cause the plaintiff foreseeable physical
injury, it was unnecessary to ask whether he was under a separate duty of care not
to cause foreseeable psychiatric injury... It could not be right that a negligent
defendant should escape liability for psychiatric injury just because, though serious
physical injury was foreseeable, it did not in fact transpire. Such a result in the
case ofa primary victim is neither necessary, logical nor just.40
Regarding the need to limit liability of the defendant, Lord Lloyd
pointed out that the law has introduced control mechanisms for secondary
victims, including requiring a degree of proximity, but that such was not
necessary in the present case involving a primary victim. 'Since liability
depends on foreseeability of physical injury, there could be no question of the
defendant finding himself liable to all the world. Proximity of relationship
cannot arise, and proximity in time and space goes without saying.' Nor did
he view the question ofthe plaintiff being of 'ordinary phlegm' as appropriate,
36 Ibid,663.
37 Ibid
38 Ibid. P 666.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid, pp 666-7
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since, according to him, 'the number of potential claimants is limited by the
nature of the case, there is no need to impose any further limit by reference to
a person of ordinary phlegm. '41 He concluded:
... it was enough to ask whether the defendant should have reasonably foreseen
that the plaintiff might suffer physical injury as a result of the defendant's
negligence, so as to bring him within the range ofthe defendant's duty of care. It
was unnecessary to ask, as a separate question, whether the defendant should
reasonably have foreseen injury by shock; and it is irrelevant that the plaintiff did
not, in fact, suffer any external physical injury42
We will now look at the dissenting options. Lord Keith characterised
the primary question to be whether proof of reasonable foreseeability should
be required in all cases of injury by nervous shock or that proof as regards
'personal injury of some kind' could be sufficient. 43 He then proceeded to lay
down the conditions for establishing liability to be 'proof both that it was
reasonably foreseeable that injury would result from the act or omission called
in question and that a relationship of proximity existed between plaintiff and
defendant' .44
Applying these conditions to the case before him, he argued, 'The
defendant can be liable only if the hypothetical reasonable man in his position
should have foreseen that the plaintiff, regarded as a person of normal
fortitude, might suffer nervous shock leading to an identifiable illness.' By
making reference to the fact that nobody was injured during the accident, that
the accident itself was described as of 'moderate severity' and expressing
uncertainty as to whether the recrudescence of the plaintiffs condition was
attributable to the accident, he ruled that a reasonable man in the position of
the defendant would not have foreseen that an accident of the nature that he
actually brought about might inflict on a person of normal susceptibility such
mental trauma as to result in illness.45 He therefore sought to dismiss the
41 Ibid. p 668.
42
Ibid. P669
43
Ibid, P647.
44 Ibid, pp 647-8
45
Ibid, P650.
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appeal.
Lord Jauncey's dissent was based on a similar characterisation of the
issue followed by a contention that the moderate severity of the damage to the
car and non-existence of an 'acute emotional trauma' made the case different
from those in which nervous shock had already been established. He referred
to the frequent tendency to leave out consideration of foreseeability in 'self-
evident' circumstances such as road accidents but noted, similarly to Deane
J, 'that is not to say that the need for it is dispensed with. It is by no means
impossible that a plaintiff could be directly involved in an accident caused by
a negligent act where the circumstances required specific proof that injury was
foreseeable.' 46 He underlined that, 'while it is not uncommon for a severe
physical injury to give rise to some degree of psychiatric illness it is not the
law that such illness is presumed to be a foreseeable consequence of every
physical injury.' 47 He therefore concluded that in a case involving only
damage to vehicles, the occurrence of psychiatric illness to an occupant(s)
could not normally be expected.48
The Unresolved Issues
It is submitted that the majority decision in the House of Lords still
needs to be clarified in many respects. First of all, where the foreseeability of
after-effects of a defendant's action/omission is in doubt, as in Page v Smith,
an imposition of a legal duty of care and hence liability, in the manner that the
House of Lords has sanctioned by affirming the appeal, will have the opposite
consequence of all previous attempts to narrow down the liability of potential
tortfeasors. This is from the point of view of fairness and the court's need to
shut the door on interminable litigation, as well as to limit claims on
consequences of consequences.
Secondly, the court could have embraced the apparent distinction,
parallel to its own classification of victims as 'primary' or 'secondary' in a
46
47
48
Ibid. P 61.
Ibid. P 652.
Ibid, pp 659-660.
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number of preceding 'nervous shock' cases,49 between what might reasonable
be termed as 'primary' and 'secondary' negligence. 50 This could have
provided a useful tool of analysis without the need to create a firm category
('heading') of negligence, something which English courts dread to do.
However, the ruling of the House of Lords skirted around the problem of
pinpointing the outer limits ('boundaries') of negligence by a wrong-doer who
arguably cannot foresee the impact of his act or omission because that impact
will be too remote to contemplate, even by the standards of the elastic
redefinition adopted in the Wagon Mound (1).51 Instead of taking up the
opportunity to explore and examine the indirect consequences of a wrong-
doer's action/omission in order to determine where the chain must be broken,
the House preferred to rely on a facile distinction of facts in this most recent
case. It merely chose to treat Page v Smith as an ordinary case of a wrong-
doer being responsible in negligence for directly occurring effects. Yet, whilst
the indirect consequences of a defendant's negligent act which will lead to
liability and those which will not should be differentiated from juridical and
policy angles, the House simply assumed that, where a primary victim is
concerned, introducing any 'control mechanisms' would not be necessary. 52
The House of Lords made a comparison between cases where the
victims are bystanders ('secondary') or direct ones ('primary'), as in Page v
Smith, but stopped short of extending its comparison beyond the stage of
identifying the victims. It did not go further and consider whether the use of
control mechanisms to minimise the number of claimants could not be
applicable to both categories of victims, rather than as Lord Lloyd attempted
to justify, to secondary victims alone. 53 Other than the assumption, in the case
of primary victims, that 'proximity in time and space goes without saying' ,54
49
50
51
52
53
54
See note 3 above
This might include 'secondary' damage occurring separately and therefore in discontinuity with any
physical injury but as a reaction to it. Such has been the characterisation in all cases which
considered negligence to secondary victims.
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (I'he Wagon Mound) [1961] AC
388.
See Lord Lloyd's argument in [1995] WLR 645, at 668.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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the question of why they cannot be brought within the 'control mechanisms'
where their claims could not be sustainable on grounds of foreseeability
remains unexplored. Indeed, Lord Keith brushed aside this crucial issue in
this way: 'Where the plaintiff is personally involved in a terrifying accident
proof of proximity presents no problem. .. Proximity clearly existed in the
present case. '55 It is not impossible that other less terrifying accidents would
occur and the issue of proximity not be as 'clear' as in the example given by
Lord Keith.
Thirdly, taking note ofadvances in medical knowledge and the fact that
the distinction between physical and psychiatric injury 'may already seem
somewhat artificial, and may soon be altogether outmoded',56 the majority of
their Lordships have argued against the law treating the two differently. It is
submitted that they could have taken this to the logical conclusion and made
the law much clearer by recognising that psychiatric harm is a physical injury
per se, in other words by relying on advances in medical science. 57 If they had
done so, the ordinary rules of negligence that they sought to rely on could have
fitted the particular case neatly-the consequence being that wherever
psychiatric illness flows from some accident for which a defendant is liable,
'nervous shock' would be ruled in as a matter of course. Since Page v Smith
could not possibly be decided on the basis ofexisting authorities (which make
it clear that nervous shock accompanying physical injury is the typical basis
for recovery), the issue whether the alleged deterioration of the medical
condition of Page should not be viewed as aform ofphysical injury appears
to have been critical.
Until that position is adopted, it will remain ironical that the majority's
ruling in Page v Smith (where physical injury was absent but mental shock
55
56
57
Ibid. pp 647-8.
Per Lord Lloyd; Ibid. at 667.
There is nothing new in this suggestion of course. Nicholas J Mullany and Peter R Handford have
already expressed this view while at the same time venting their dismay Cat p 42) against decisions
in a number of nervous shock cases: ' ... in many respects the common law has either clung to
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occurred) was identical to those in earlier cases where mental illness followed
from physical injury. Indeed, it would be hard to explain how a bystander
who witnessed the accident and got a mental shock would be turned away
from claiming recovery while the current victim got what he sought without
satisfYing the legal test of foreseeability for the specific tort.
A more difficult scenario could have been had Page not been affected
in any way but his wife had received the news of the disaster and suffered
shock. Could she have been able to claim successfully against Smith on the
basis of the ruling in McLoughlin, since that case seems to match her
situation? It would appear to be very doubtful. As Mullany and Handford
suggest (at p 91), 'secondary parties have no rights separate from that of the
victim-they can be compensated only through the victim, and only in so far
as it is appropriate so to compensate them.' If the first victim cannot claim on
the basis of foreseeability and proximity, it would appear too far fetched for
his wife, a secondary victim, to have any chance of success.
This hypothetical example may illustrate the point that, instead of
Products Ltd v British Steel Corporation58 considering the defendant's
argument on their merits, the House of Lords seemed to have been tempted
into using precedent authority, spare though it may have been, and declined
to find differently when all indications were that there was a new issue. The
consequences of the decision in Page v Smith is that so long as a primary
victim is proximate to what appears to be a tortious act or omission, the
chance of succeeding against the tortfeasor or any 'heading' of liability will not
be under question. Yet, a blanket ruling that proof will not be required of a
primary victim, even in the absence of physical injury, will thwart the thrust
of previous decisions.
In the end, the elementary but crucial issues of whether both the plaintiff
and the kind of damage were foreseeable must continue to be relevant to all
cases, regardless of whether the claimant is primary or secondary. In so far
as the main issue under litigation would be likely to be indirect rather than
direct consequences (claims under the latter no longer having to be fought out
each time they occur since they now form elementary principles of tort law),59
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the time will not be far off when the House of Lords might find it necessary
to rethink its decision in Page v Smith and resolve the issue of foreseeability
in 'secondary negligence'.
Conclusion
Previous decisions in McLoughlin and Alcock addressed the ambit of
indirect consequences to secondary victims in general and demonstrated the
court's reluctance to deny remedy to all claimants although it was ready at the
same time to break the chain of causation where it saw fit. The award in
McLoughlin on the one hand, and the refusal in Alcock on the other, indicate
the delicate balancing ofvarying factors the House of Lords took into account
while trying not to spread the net of liability too wide, particularly where the
consequence to the tortfeasor might appear catastrophic. Judicial extension
of the limits of liability in certain instances and discriminatory application of
the rule to restrain claims in others have not, however, provided clear leads as
to what are the appropriate criteria that help identify the scope of liability in
'secondary' negligence. .
It is therefore understandable that, lacking previous direct authority
regarding the fresh question of foreseeability of nervous shock to a primary
victim that arose in Page v Smith, the Court of Appeal manifested an
instinctive reaction while the House of Lords sought to use the convenient
device of not seeing anything new in the case before them. The ruling of the
House ofLords has only lent prominence to the issue and the need to address
it. Could one reject the defendant's argument of unforeseeability and remain
consistent with prior case law which underscores the need to limit liability
where foreseeability and remoteness stand in the way of any claims, be it by
a primary or secondary victim? Was it necessary that Page's condition ought
to have been foreseeable to Smith for the former to succeed (per the Court of
Appeal) or that it did not matter at all (per the House of Lords)?
The obvious shortcut would have been establishing new frontiers or
solutions to the problem so that the scope of 'secondary' negligence could be
clarified in the same process. It might be recalled that Bourhill v Young was
decided on the basis of existence of duty, which was easier to consider, rather
than on the foreseeability of the harm which was caused to the fish wife. The
House of Lords' reluctance to budge from the typical duty-of-care-breach-of-
duty-causation approach has not helped overcome that kind of difficulty.
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It does not seem that the Court ofAppeal's decision was an unnecessary
complication (per Lord Lloyd). It is the author's contention that requiring
foreseeability of nervous shock as such, in place offoreseeability of harm in
general to a primary victim, was not asking a separate question. Indeed, as
Mullany and Handford argue (at p 68) 'foreseeability is required not only of
the plaintiff but also of the kind of damage suffered or, if more than one type
of damage is inflicted, of each king of damage'.
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